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Abstract 
An emerging branch of political theory, “the politics of dissensus,” starts out from the premise 
that in order to understand the politics of constitutional democracies, one needs to focus on 
parliamentary politics, which compromises both institutional settings and debates. Politics takes 
place among adversaries, and dissensus and argumentation pro et contra is the rule. The focus 
on the conditions for consensus in contemporary democratic theory accordingly misses the 
essence of politics. The politics of dissensus tends to think that the political philosophy 
inaugurated by John Rawls, political liberalism in particular, is too idealistic and utopian to 
capture real parliamentary politics. I argue that this basic objection against political liberalism 
is misconceived. To the contrary, the politics of dissensus and political liberalism supplements 
each other. The impact of my argument is that research in these disparate fields of political 
studies ought to enlighten each other. 
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I: The topic 
In “Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People,” Willard Quine states that “Until the nineteenth 
century, all available scientific knowledge of any consequence could be encompassed by a 
single first-class mind.” However, “This cosy situation ended as science expanded and 
deepened. Subtle distinctions crowded in and technical jargon proliferated, much of which is 
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genuinely needed.”1 Today, this is the situation even within the individual sciences, and the 
field “Political Philosophy” or “Political Science” – labels are inconsequential – is no exception. 
Reflections over theories of justice and the normative foundations of democracy, on the one 
hand, and parliamentary studies, on the other, are but two examples of specialized subfields 
within political philosophy or political science.2 Roughly speaking, the former reflects on 
abstract normative principles and the latter investigates real politics as it takes place in space 
and time. Although new distinctions and improved technical jargon are necessary to bring 
political philosophy forward, specialization has its drawbacks. The great philosopher and 
political theorist J. S. Mill reflected on the fundamental normative principles of the ideal form 
of government and ways of organizing and improving the structure of and the debates within 
the English parliament, in one volume.3 The situation today appears to be that the theorists who 
study the normative foundations of democracy find what goes on in parliaments to be more or 
less irrelevant to their subject, while those who study the complex organization of parliaments, 
and how politics unfolds in these institutions, suspect the former theorists to be out of touch 
with politics. 
I find this tendency unfortunate from both an intellectual and a practical point of view. 
My attempt at a remedy is to focus on the political liberalism inherited from John Rawls and 
on a recent collection of essays on parliamentary studies, unified by the committal and 
substantial title The Politics of Dissensus. In this essay, I use “the politics of dissensus” and 
“political liberalism” as markers for given theoretical conceptions. My aim is to demonstrate 
that despite the impression to the contrary, encouraged by the term “overlapping consensus” 
and other reasons, political liberalism does not exclude or even unjustifiably restrict politics, 
and that it is consistent with the politics of dissensus’s empirical-historical and less normative 
approach to politics. Given that these fields are consistent and guided by dissimilar aims and 
conceptualizations, it seems to me that combined studies in the spirit of Mill might prove 
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fruitful.4 My purpose is not to evaluate the politics of dissensus or political liberalism per se, 
but to reflect on their conceptual relationship. 
Political liberalism is here understood as a realistic utopia, and, accordingly, politics is 
approached from the point of view of a well-ordered society.5 Now, as is well known, Rawls 
wrote Political Liberalism against the constitutional background that he knew from the 
“inside,” namely that of the USA. A central feature of this constitution is that it has a strong 
judicial review, and consequently the principal political reasoning is paradigmatically displaced 
by the written verdicts of the Supreme Court. Many European democracies, England in 
particular, have weak, if any judicial review and the principal political reasoning takes place in 
the parliament.6 I do not view this as a problem for political liberalism, as the main point is that 
principal or public reason plays a crucial role in deliberative democracy, not its primary forum.7 
The assumed realistic utopia simplifies my analysis and it is justified by the fact that if it is 
correct that politics – as circumscribed by the collection of papers in The Politics of Dissensus 
– is an essential feature of democratic well-ordered societies with a strong parliamentary 
system, politics is present in any constitutional democracy of that kind. My main point is that 
political liberalism gives a model for the logic and limits of deliberation and it is not a consensus 
theory of politics.  
I begin by introducing main features of the politics of dissensus (Part II). I then show 
that the overlapping consensus that lies at the heart of political liberalism is not itself the result 
of deliberation (Part III). After this, I argue that political liberalism is coherent with the view 
on parliamentary deliberation developed by the politics of dissensus (Part IV). In the fifth part, 
I turn to the so-called “Conversational model” of deliberation. I demonstrate that even if 
political liberalism accepts this model, which is a question I leave open, it does not mean that 
failing to reach a consensus signals that the debaters have not tried hard enough or have not 
been sincere, or anything like that. It all depends on one’s take on the idea of the “force of the 
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better argument.” I provide some comments on the normative idea of public reason and I 
introduce a topic for an empirical parliamentary study that I believe would enlighten the present 
speculations.  
 
II: The Politics of Dissensus 
In the introduction to their recent book, Kari Palonen, José María Rosales and Tapani Turkka 
boldly state that  
 
The Politics of Dissensus argues a novel perspective on the study of parliamentary 
politics. Although it shares the recognition and appreciation of the practices of 
parliamentary politics, it inverts the traditional perspective by focusing on its less 
obvious and less well-known aspects. Dissensus instead of consensus then becomes the 
raison d’être, the conceptual condition for the intelligibility of parliamentary politics.8  
 
The framework, the conceptual web, of this perspective is that of a constitutional liberal 
democracy with a strong, law-making, and responsible parliament, and with weak judicial 
review. Although this is a “novel perspective,” the politics of dissensus draws on a distinguished 
tradition within political science and the history of ideas. It is deeply influenced by the 
understanding of politics expressed in the writings of Max Weber and Quentin Skinner. A basic 
premise to these authors is the dynamic and holistic character of politics, where no concepts, or 
point of view, including human rights, liberty or equality, are sacred and withdrawn from 
contextual interpretation.9 According to the editors of The Politics of Dissensus, “for decades 
parliament’s political centrality has been disregarded by democratic theory.”10 “Democratic 
theory,” as the term is used here, points towards studies within political science that focus on 
existing forms of democratic deliberations, such as town meetings, worker-managed 
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organizations, and mini-publics, and conduct experiments with different deliberative set-ups.11 
As a rule, these studies take consensus to be the core-concept of deliberation, and they look for 
the success-principles for obtaining this result in varying circumstances. Political dissensus 
maintains that these widespread attempts at spelling out the characteristics of deliberative 
democracy are politically inconsequential, as they do not provide models for the real and 
important political deliberation that takes place in parliamentary debates.12 Consequently, they 
miss out one of the prerequisites for understanding politics, and thereby the very core of 
deliberative democracy. In their own words and with a historical touch: “Normative democratic 
theory, however, soon separated the idea of deliberative democracy from parliament (… ) thus 
depoliticising parliaments.”13 Although I am not going into the main features of democratic 
theory, the topic is complicated and demands a separate treatment, I would like to mention that 
the dialectic situation is delicate. Political dissensus uses “depoliticising” in a negative sense, 
while to democratic theory it is positively loaded. For the latter, it is crucial to preserve or save 
certain areas of human interaction and deliberation from politics, as it distrusts the power 
relations, the voting systems, and the external factors that typically influence on the verdicts 
made by the parliament. Such factors makes politics less rational and consensus-oriented than 
well-functioning deliberation aimed at truth, justice, or some other high non-political value.14 
It seems to me that when politics of dissensus introduces a distinction between “parliamentary 
politics” and “politics in parliament,” part of the purpose is to separate two factors that they 
think are conflated in democratic theory.15 In any case, at present, I focus exclusively on 
parliamentary politics. 
 The passage from the introduction to The Politics of Disensus, cited above, continues: 
 
Certainly parliamentary politics is indebted to the rhetorical culture of addressing issues 
from opposite views and debating the alternatives pro et contra. In parliamentary 
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procedure dissensus and debate are institutionalised: no motion is approved without a 
thorough examination of and confrontation among imaginable alternatives.16 
 
To keep things simple and in line with the politics of dissensus, let us understand 
political deliberation as argumentation pro et contra.17 Let us call the proposition or course of 
action that grounds the argumentation for “Pc” (standing for “Proposition/course of action 
under consideration”). The debaters pay (or appear to pay) due respect to the relevance and 
validity of the arguments that support or oppose a given Pc. 18 The debate is fair, according to 
some specification or another of this multifarious notion.19 The debaters have (or argue as if 
they have) a common aim, namely to reach the just or best outcome in accordance with some 
independently fixed notions of “just” or “good.”20 It is important not to misunderstand this 
description in the direction of some given and ready-made criterion for judging the strength and 
weaknesses of an argument. In accordance with the Weberian and Skinnerian insights alluded 
to above, it is evident that no criterion is fixed and withdrawn from controversy and 
deliberation.21 In real political debates taking place inside or outside the parliament, a consensus 
is the exception, not the rule:  
 
Although the omnipresence of dissensus, conflict, controversy, dispute and debates in 
politics is widely acknowledged, they tend to be regarded in political institutions as 
provisional stages to be overcome in the final moment of decision-making. Our 
perspective turns the terms around to see final decisions as temporary de-actualizations 
of dissensus, whereas dissensual activities are taken as the heart of politics. Consensus 
is understood as a marginal case of dissensus, visible in moments such as, for instance, 
that it is better to agree upon some budget than none. Politics is, in other words, a 
quintessentially contingent and controversial activity (…) the guiding procedural 
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principle of parliamentary politics teaches that the political content of a proposal can 
only be judged if it is examined from opposing perspectives and confronted with 
alternative proposals.22 
 
The fruitfulness of this general approach to parliamentary debates is clear from the collections 
of articles in The Politics of Dissensus and Parliamentarism and Democratic Theory.23 
Fortunately, for the present purposes, we do not need to go beyond this rough picture. For, 
despite the fact that I have not encountered any theoretical explanation of the basic notion of 
argumentation pro et contra among the scholars of political dissensus, it is clear that in their 
opinion reasoning and argumentation do take place in parliamentary politics, not just screaming 
and stamping of the feet. My apparently paradoxical claim is that to view the nature of politics 
as a primarily dissensual activity is consistent with political liberalism’s approach to 
parliamentary debates (in a well-ordered society) as based on an overlapping consensus. 
Formulated differently, given that a focus on consensus makes politics into something it is not, 
and should not be, political liberalism does not debar politics.24 Let me reformulate in light of 
a remark from The politics of Dissensus:  
 
Parliamentarism establishes the openness of political debating, and its relying on an 
irreducible plurality of perspectives has become a distinctive historical contribution to 
the rise of parliamentary democracy.25    
  
I am going to argue that “an irreducible plurality of perspectives” is a characterizing feature of 
political liberalism, due to the fact of reasonable pluralism. This stands in sharp contrast to most 




III: Deliberative Consensus versus Overlapping Consensus  
Rosales maintains that “the most salient features of deliberative democratic theory” in Rawls’s 
writings is to be found in the analysis of the deliberation that takes place in the analytic tool 
called “the Original Position” in A Theory of Justice.27 The fall-out of the deliberation is the 
social conception of justice labelled “justice as fairness.”28 As Rosales observes: 
 
The veil of ignorance means a requirement for impartial deliberation, unlikely 
reproducible in real deliberative processes unless adapted, but valid as procedural ideal 
guarantee in the formulation of a theory of justice. Discussing the ‘status of majority 
rule’ in legislative procedures Rawls reminds that real deliberations of ‘representative 
legislators’ hardly resembles the ideal process.29 
 
 
Rosales’s claim that the deliberation involved in Rawls’s thought-experiment does not resemble 
political deliberation is correct, and Rawls would agree. He concludes his historical-conceptual 
investigation by reflecting on the post-Rawlsian (and post-Habermasian) situation in current 
democratic theory: 
 
Thus the discussion around associations and democracy resumed central themes of 
democratic theory, from citizen participation and democratic deliberation to inclusion 
and representativeness of the democratic process, but began reformulating them. 
Democratic theory largely became normative democratic theory. It focused on 
counterfactual considerations to devise ideal procedures of political deliberation, that 
way assuming the normative leaning of mainstream political philosophy. As we have 
seen deliberative experiments do not easily reproduce comparable conditions to those 
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of real political debates, as they leave behind relevant aspects of parliamentary politics 
regulated by legislative procedures.30 
 
Rosales is certainly right in maintaining that although Habermas and Rawls inspire normative 
democratic theory, it goes beyond them in abstracting from the institutional frameworks at the 
basis of the normative theories of these authors. Rawls’s work, as a whole, classifies as a branch 
of moral philosophy.31 However, it is not the kind of normative thinking associated with 
democratic theory, namely attempts at re-describing, improving, or changing democratic 
political deliberation into genuine democratic deliberation.32 The author of A Theory of Justice 
and Political Liberalism never thought of new designs for deliberation, political or non-
political. Now, it might well be that to democratic theory Rawls’s thought-experiment gives a 
paradigmatic ideal for a real deliberation about a deep normative issue, namely our basic social 
principles of justice. However, as this thought-experiment is not designed with the purpose of 
providing a model for deliberations in a democratic regime, it is arguable that Rosales and 
Rawls share the view that the term “deliberative” in “deliberative democracy” is not a pointer 
in the direction of a consensus-theory of deliberation.  
After this clarification, let us turn to political liberalism.33 This is a key-passage from 
Political Liberalism: 
 
The idea of an overlapping consensus is easily misunderstood given the idea of 
consensus in ordinary politics. Its meaning for us arises thus: we suppose a constitutional 
democratic regime to be reasonably just and workable, and worth defending. Yet given 
the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can we frame our defence of it so that it can win 




It is urgent to warn against conflating consensus in ordinary politics and overlapping consensus. 
Political consensus is deliberative consensus, and, according to the politics of dissensus, it is 
rare in well-functioning parliamentary regimes, while an overlapping consensus is not 
deliberative. The key-notion is that of reasonable pluralism within a constitutional democratic 
regime. This idea, maybe the single most important premise behind political liberalism, is that 
reasonable citizens in an industrial modern society disagree on fundamental issues, such as what 
the basic goods are and on how to live the best life, and, at the same time, realize that the others, 
with whom they disagree, are reasonable.35 The fact of reasonable pluralism is grounded in the 
phenomenon that Rawls labels the “burdens of judgement.” In order to explain this, Rawls 
proposes an open-ended, non-reducible list of elements that influence our judgements, 
containing such factors as the complexity and relative weighting of evidence, the vagueness of 
basic concepts, and our total experience.36 In this light, it is unreasonable and certainly unwise 
to expect citizens to share one or just a few so-called comprehensive doctrines.37 In short, 
political liberalism is a theory for a society and not a community.38 
An overlapping consensus is a consensus on a family of social conceptions of justice, 
where each member satisfies a given, classically liberal list of conditions.39 These conceptions 
furthermore “meet the criterion of reciprocity and recognise the burdens of judgment.”40 The 
criterion of reciprocity is defined as “when terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of 
fair cooperation, those proposing them must think it at least reasonable for others to accept 
them, as free and equal citizens.”41 Its purpose is to ensure that all citizens “as free and equal, 
can cooperate with each other on terms all can accept.”42 In this context, the fact of reasonable 
pluralism implies that in a well-ordered society, the citizens hold both a reasonable 
comprehensive (or partly comprehensive) doctrine and a social conception of justice. The 
relationship between these ideas might be as strong as a deductive one or as weak as 
coherence.43 The basic point is that the citizens of a democratic regime work out for themselves 
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the relationship between their understanding of the basic goods and their political views and 
values.44 A crucial factor for an appreciation of political liberalism is always to keep in mind 
that its starting point is from the inside of our common democratic tradition; all its key-concepts 
belong to this very tradition. The citizens view each other as free and equal citizens and they 
adopt or form a social conception of justice that respects this liberal and political value. 
However, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine need not itself be liberal. It is to be expected 
that religious doctrines, for instance, prevail among citizens of such a regime.45 Of course, 
helped by fellow citizens reasoning from conjecture, one might come to realize that a reasonable 
liberal political conception of justice follows from, or is coherent with one’s higher or non-
political values, but, again, this is not deliberation.46 At present, my moderate aim is to make 
clear that an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable social conceptions of justice is 
not, and cannot be, the result of a deliberation, but concern the relation between a social 
conception of justice and a comprehensive doctrine. In this light, it seems as if the politics of 
dissensus can and should appreciate the burdens of judgement and the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, as they provide a foundation for the fact that it is unreasonable to expect consensus 
in political deliberation in a well-ordered society. As a partial vindication of this assumption, I 
would like to cite a remark from one of the contributors to The Politics of Dissensus, Enrico 
Biale, who defends a complex conceptualization of compromise: 
 
In a pluralistic society that includes people with different, and sometimes conflicting, 
opinions, preferences, and ideals, it is reasonable to assume that there will be 
disagreements regarding these important issues. Moreover, although members of a 
pluralistic society acknowledge one another as free and equal, they do not necessarily 
agree on principles of justice that could provide a shared standard against which to 
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assess political proposals or laws and policies (the input and output, respectively, of the 
decision-making process). 
 Even if the citizens share principles of justice, they would disagree on their 
interpretation and the best way to implement these principles.47  
 
Biale’s observations capture nicely basic facts of political liberalism. The reasonable citizens 
will hold one of a number of conflicting social conceptions of justice, and none of these 
conceptions is self-interpretable. Accordingly, conflicting views might prevail among 
defenders of the same conception. There is an additional feature to be taken into consideration, 
namely that those who hold the same comprehensive doctrine, need not agree to exactly the 
same social conception of justice. All this means that the burdens of judgement must always be 
taken into account when we reflect on political issues and political judgements. (If this sounds 
like a kind of relativism, we must not forget that the criterion of reciprocity and the associated 
understanding of the reasonable secure the needed bulwark.)   
  
 IV: Political Liberalism and Dissensus 
In Political Liberalism, there is one comment that appears to go against the very idea of politics, 
in particular. It comes as the third element of Rawls’s explanation of the notion of social unity:48  
 
Public political discussion, when constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice 
are at stake, are always, or nearly always, reasonably decidable on the basis of reasons 
specified by one of a family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice, one of which 




In order to comprehend what is going on here, let us begin by substantiating the key-phrase 
“constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.” “These”, says Rawls, “are of two kinds:”  
 
(a) fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and the 
political process: the powers of the legislature, executive and the judiciary; the scope of 
majority rules; and 
(b) equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect: 
such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of 
thought and association, as well as the protections of the rule of law.50  
 
Clearly, as Rawls observes, among regimes with free institutions, (a) varies far more than (b). 
With respect to our theme, we note that “principles governing social and economic inequalities” 
are not included in the list. Therefore, even if questions of constitutional essentials are settled 
by consensus – which Rawls notes are not always the case, from time to time even such issues 
are settled by the majority – issues concerning the application of social conceptions of justice 
on pressing social and economic questions, are seldom thus decided. The reason is clear: 
 
Whether the constitutional essentials covering the basic freedoms are satisfied is more 
or less visible on the face of constitutional arrangements and how these can be seen to 
work in practice. But whether the aims of the principles covering social and economic 
inequalities are realized is far more difficult to ascertain. These matters are nearly 
always open to wide differences of reasonable opinion; they rest on complicated 
inferences and intuitive judgments that require us to assess complex social and 
economic information about topics poorly understood. Thus, although questions of both 
kinds are to be discussed in terms of political values, we can expect more agreement 
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about whether the principles for the basic rights and liberties are realized than about 
whether the principles for social and economic justice are realized.51 
 
Political values form part of the content of public reason.52 This means that even when political 
deliberation is limited to public reason, that is, is grounded on arguments derived from social 
conceptions of justice, dissensus prevails. The exception might be basic questions essential to 
the very core of our idea of democracy. The ideal of public debate is that it is restricted to the 
principle of reciprocity and that the debaters follow the moral duty of civility.53 Therefore, it 
would be preferable that all, or close to all, political questions debated in parliament are treated 
in light of public reason and its values.54 However, to repeat, this is not to say that such issues 
would be settled by consensus.55  
 I think Anthoula Malkopoulou gives voice to a common misreading of Rawls, early and 
late, when she, from the perspective of the politics of dissensus, writes that: 
 
If we side with the rhetorical or parliamentary approach to deliberation, then subjective 
reason, perspectivism and disagreement become a sine quo non of political discussion. 
To the contrary, the Rawlsian and Habermasian variants of deliberative democracy are 
rather at odds with this idea, as they place emphasis on justice and consensus 
respectively. Even if they accept that a political discussion may not always lead to 
agreement, deliberative judgement still has a clear priority over will. But, talking to our 
interlocutors and expecting them to accept our opinions merely because they are 
‘reasonable’ may betray less than horizontal approach to political discussions than the 




First, we have seen that the consensus of “overlapping consensus” is not a political consensus, 
or the end-point of a deliberation. Therefore, on this point no clear disagreement is detectable. 
The question that remains concerns the scope of reason. If Malkopoulou by “subjective reasons” 
means “all kinds of personal reasons,” including “religious reasons” and “reasons due to 
personal experience,” then there is a clear difference between her positions and that of political 
liberalism, with its restriction of parliamentary debate to public reason. (But, consider note 20 
and the discussion leading up to it.) However, this difference does not concern the logic of 
deliberation. 
Another misunderstanding is that Malkopoulou ascribes to Rawls the idea that a 
reasonable person expects her interlocutors to agree with her because they are reasonable, as 
well. However, it is exactly the other way around. To be a reasonable person is to realize that 
there are limits to what can be reasonable justified to others. When serious political and moral 
issues are at stake, the reasonable person does not expect, but of course, she hopes, that other 
reasonable persons will agree with her.57 In fact, to accept that other reasonable persons disagree 
with you, in the face of your well-developed and reflective arguments, is part of what makes 
you a reasonable person. 
Now, if one takes political liberalism to imply or presuppose a consensus theory of 
politics, then one might think that in the comparatively rare cases where questions of 
constitutional essentials are not settled by public reason, one might introduce into the debate 
additional arguments aiming for a consensus. But no! Sometimes, as in the case of a verdict in 
court, one must simply leave the decision to the rulings of the majority:  
 
Thus, when there seems to be a stand-off, that is, legal arguments seem evenly balanced 
on both sides, judges cannot simply resolve the case by appealing to their own political 
views (…). The same holds with public reason: if when stand-off occur, citizens invoke 
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the grounding reasons of their comprehensive views, then the principle of reciprocity is 
violated. The reasons deciding constitutional essentials and basic justice are no longer 
those that we may reasonably expect that all citizens may reasonably endorse … From 
the point of view of public reason citizens should simply vote for the ordering of 
political values they sincerely think the most reasonable. Otherwise we fail to exercise 
political power in ways that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.58 
 
Let me round off this part by introducing two more passages from Political Liberalism 
that make it clear that there is plenty of room for politics even in a well-ordered constitutional 
regime: 
 
However, disputed questions, such as that of abortion, may lead to a stand-off between 
different political conceptions, and citizens must simply vote on the question. Indeed, 
this is the normal case: unanimity of views is not to be expected. Reasonable political 
conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same conclusion (…) nor do citizens 
holding the same conception always agree on particular issues.59 
 
In general, prevalent reasonable doctrines and the family of social conceptions of justice 
belonging to the overlapping consensus do not decide political issues. Rawls discusses in some 
detail the cluster of complex and demanding issues concerning the family and its structure. He 
demonstrates that political liberalism has no saying on these issues, with the exception of the 
considerably weak claim that they must be decided within the framework of the constitutional 
essentials.60 We might specify citizens in the direction of representatives in the passage just 
cited, and then we have a case of dissensus and a verdict made by the force of the majority.  




[T]he ideal of public reason does not often lead to general agreements of views, nor 
should it. Citizens learn and profit from conflict and argument, and when their 
arguments follow public reason, they instruct and deepen society’s public culture.61  
 
This echoes some basic ideas in J.S. Mill’s On Liberty. Unresolved disagreement, i.e., dissensus 
– especially in cases where the arguments are guided by public reason – is valuable.62  
I am not alone in taking Rawls to be a scholar that values politics and does not want to 
get rid of it. This is Joshua Cohen’s apt formulation: 
  
[I]n his political liberalism, Rawls embraces the deliberative conception of democratic 
politics while also accepting that, even under the best circumstances we can reasonable 
hope for, members of a democratic society will disagree with one another about what 
justice requires (…) politics is, in the first instance, a matter of deliberation: of citizens 
and representatives defending laws and policies by reference to reasons drawn from a 
conception of justice that they might reasonably expect others to endorse.63  
 
Cohen, as I, takes the ideal that for a deliberation to be successful, it ends in consensus, to be 
an idea of democratic theory that does not belong to political liberalism. I discuss this topic in 
the next and final part. 
 
V: The Conversational Model and Normativity  




[T]he contemporary mainstream on deliberation and deliberative democracy follows 
what Gary Remer calls ‘the conversational model’. This model presents three main 
features: 1) deliberation is conceived as a free and open dialogue; 2) the strict symmetry 
of the partners, so that dialogue takes place between equals; and 3) dialogue is 
understood as a cooperative enterprise where only ‘the force of the better argument’ 
matters (Toscano 2014, 409).   
 
Toscano forcefully argues that this model is not appropriate for actual parliamentary debates, 
which typically take place among adversaries.64 For the sake of the argument, let us assume that 
deliberations in the parliament in a well-ordered society pay due respect to the three features – 
but for reasons that will become evident, let us rephrase the third as “3) dialogue is understood 
as an enterprise where only ‘the force of the better argument’ matters.” One might think that 
given these normative constraints, in the normal case the decisions made by such a parliament 
are consensus-based. However, this conclusion is unwarranted. On the contrary, in this 
hypothetical and idealized situation, the basic insight of the politics of dissensus still holds; that 
is to say, the parliamentary debates typically take place among adversaries.65 This becomes 
clear from some reflections on how to understand the phrase “the force of the better argument” 
from the point of view of political liberalism. Assume that we have a paradigmatic case of 
argumentation pro et contra, where one member of the parliament argues in favour of Pc, and 
another argues against Pc, neither argues for personal gain or suchlike, and both regard the other 
as equal. Assume furthermore that it is shared knowledge between the two contenders that this 
is the case. These representatives subscribe to the full conversational model. However, and this 
is the decisive point, they might be aware of the fact that the attempt at persuading the other, 
likewise reasonable and rational representative, is on all counts a lost case. In such a situation, 
which I gather would be quite common in the well-ordered regime, the two debaters are 
19 
 
adversaries: they cannot agree and at most, one of them wins; that is, unless a bearable 
compromise is reached.66 It follows that if the conversational model is taken to be a model for 
reaching consensus in debates, it is too idealistic to fit parliamentary debates in a well-ordered 
society. However, if one rejects, as political liberalism does, the naïve and anti-political 
assumption that the “force of the best argument” means that there always or normally is such 
an argument available, then, as argued, political liberalism displays a model for the logic and 
limits of deliberation, and not a model for consensus. This is because when underlying 
presuppositions about reason and rationality are brought to light, it is evident that the 
conversational model does not imply that a failure to reach a consensus indicates either that one 
or more of the debaters do not accept the model, or that they should continue debating until a 
consensus is established. This shows that there is no tension between political liberalism and 
the slightly modified conversational model of deliberation, on the one hand, and the politics of 
dissensus on the other. 
 Allow me to formulate an empirically refutable conjecture concerning parliamentary 
politics. Political liberalism starts out from inside our existing, but not fully well-ordered, 
constitutional democracies. It takes these to be the result of contingent historical processes that 
involve both material and conceptual factors, including a refined awareness among the 
members of the parliament of the kinds of arguments that are appropriate to their office. I 
conjecture that if one undertook a diachronic parliamentary study of the kinds of arguments 
used in a selected group of parliaments, say the Scandinavian ones, over a time-span of the last 
50 years, one would find that they tend to become restricted to social conceptions of justice, 
and presented as self-standing and independent of comprehensive doctrines. Such a study would 
be highly instructive, and throw light on our speculations about the origin and continuous 
development of political liberalism and parliamentary politics. 
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Let me close off with a final observation. A major point behind politics of dissensus is 
to push back moralism of all kinds.67 A defender of this approach towards political philosophy 
could maintain that political liberalism fails in that it starts out from an ideal picture of citizens 
and members of parliament as rational and reasonable, and that it is therefore founded on 
moralistic presuppositions. This vision of a citizen and a representative, however, is not nearly 
as substantial as those one regularly encounters in normative political theory, be it democracy 
theory, contract-theory, communitarianism, or critical theory in the hands of Habermas or 
Honneth, or Marxism. To refuse to take into account normative assumptions on the human being 
and better or worse forms of deliberation would be to reject normative political theory in all its 
branches. I do not think that the politics of dissensus is meant to be an exclusively descriptive 
project, for in that case, it is hard to see how it might have a bearing on the pressing political 
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10 Palonen, et.al. (eds.) 2014, 2. 
11 Cf. Fung 2007, Pettit 2004 and Setälä 2015. 
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14 Cf. Fung 2007, Pettit 2004 and Urbinati 2010. 
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16 Palonen, et. al. (eds.) 2014, 3. 
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article “Die ‘Objectivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis,” somewhat unfortunately 
translated into English as “’Objectivity’ in Social Sciences and Social Policy” (knowledge is left out) (Weber 
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2012); cf. Blanc 2015 and Palonen and Rosales (eds.) 2015, 308. In note 21 some of the simplifications are 
noted. 
18 There is a lot to be learned about rational deliberation from Arne Næss’s classical booklet from 1966, although 
it focuses on the singular rational actor, and thus on what Toscano calls “deliberation within” (Toscano 2014, 
404–405).    
19 Palonen 2014 provides a detailed and illuminating discussion of this complex ideal.   
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parliamentarians since the sixteen century; cf. Rosales 2014, 25, Elster 1998, 101–105 and Urbinati 2010, 83. 
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generations of scholarship have debated whether the ideal of rational, unanimous agreement is practically 
feasible and normative desirable or whether it is impossible, given the circumstances of value pluralism and deep 
disagreement, and political perilous, as it may serve to oppress certain ideas, interests or identities. Recent 
scholarship on deliberative democracy has sought to find more workable notions of legitimate outcomes – for 
instance, meta-consensus, working agreements and moral compromise. Yet many still hold the notion of rational 
consensus to be a regulative ideal constitutive of deliberative democracy, for if we do not assume that we can 
and should be able to rationally persuade each other, why should we engage in public discourse?” 
(http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/research/areas/constitutionalism/consensusparadox-blog/cfp-deliberation-
after-consensus) 
23 Palonen and Rosales (eds.) 2015. If Nadia Urbinati’s reading of John Stuart Mill is correct, he can be viewed 
as a forerunner of the politics of dissensus: “[Mill] did not propose that we deliberate in order to reach a 
consensus, and thus bury dissent; rather, we deliberate in order to reach decisions, but decisions do not imply 
consensus” (Urbinati 2002, 4).  
24 To my knowledge, none of the defenders of the politics of dissensus has formulated such a strong claim in 
print. However, Palonen (at the conference Ideas and Realities of Democracy, The Åland Islands Peace Institute, 
Mariehamn, 26–27, September 2013), and Rosales (in his rejoinder to my presentation of an earlier version of 
this article at the conference Ethics, Democracy and Rights, University of Córdoba, 7–8 November 2014), 
maintain that Rawls’s political philosophy, early and late, suffers severely from a lack of grasp on real politics 
and parliamentary procedures. See also the discussion of Malkopoulou 2014 below. 
25 Palonen, et.al. (eds.) 2014, 3. 
26 A comprehensive liberalism bases its political philosophy on some fundamental non-political value, typically 
autonomy (I. Kant) or individuality (J. S. Mill).   
27 Cf. Rosales 2014, 42–43. 
28 The term “justice as fairness” is ambiguous; it either stands for a conception of justice, or it stands for this 
conception together with its elaborate justification, including, among a number of features, that of the Original 
Position. In note 39, “justice as fairness” is used in the first, limited sense. 
29 Rosales 2014, 42. 
30 Rosales 2014, 43. 
31 Cf. Rawls 1996, xxxviii, 2001, §5 and Floyd 2007, 18. 
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32 Sandel 2009, Chapter 6, provides strong arguments for the claim that the contract reached behind the veil of 
ignorance is a paradigmatic case of a morally, and not solely legally binding contract.  
33 For a clear account of Rawls’s two political philosophies, cf. Dreben 2002.  
34 Rawls 1996, 39. 
35 “The fact of reasonable pluralism which characterizes a society with free institutions […] is the fact of 
profound and irreconcilable differences in citizens’ reasonable comprehensive religious and philosophical 
conceptions of the world, and in their views of the moral and aesthetic values to be sought in human life” (Rawls 
2001, 3–4). 
36 Cf. Rawls, 1996, 56–57 and Alnes 2015 and 2014. 
37 For the notion of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine, cf. Rawls 1996, 58–66. 
38 Cf. Rawls 1996, 201. 
39 Cf. Rawls 1996, xlviii. Rawls realized that the overlapping consensus must be on a family of social 
conceptions of justice, and not just on one, preferably justice as fairness, only after the first edition of Political 
Liberalism was out. This issue is treated in the introduction to the paperback edition from 1996 and in Rawls 
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40 Rawls 1996, xlix. 
41 Rawls 1999, 14. 
42 Rawls 1996, 50. 
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(n15) and 1999, 131 (n2). For a good explication, cf. Dreben 2003, 329–331. 
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the religious, philosophical, and moral ground it provides” (Rawls 1996, 147). 
45 Rawls 1996, xxxix–xl. I explicate the distinction between reasonable and non-reasonable religious 
comprehensive doctrines in Alnes 2015.   
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47 Biale 2015, 187. 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
48 This form an ingredient of Rawls’s response to a well-known class of communitarian objections against 
political liberalism (cf. also Rawls 2001, 198–202).  
49 Rawls 1996, xlix–l. 
50 Rawls 1996, 227. 
51 Rawls 1996, 229–230. 
52 Cf. Rawls 1996, 224–225. 
53 The duty of civility consists in being able “to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the 
principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason” 
(Rawls 1996, 217).  
54 Cf. Rawls 1996, 214–215. 
55 Chantal Mouffe states that “Rawls’s ideal society is a society from which politics has been eliminated (…) 
Conflicts of interests about economic and social issues (if they still arise) are resolved smoothly through 
discussions within the framework of public reason, by invoking the principles of justice that are endorsed by 
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that this understanding of the utopian features of Rawls is incorrect. (Cf. this remark “This reasonable society is 
neither a society of saints nor a society of the self-centred. It is very much a part of our ordinary human world, 
not a world we think of much virtue, until we find ourselves without it” (Rawls, 1996, 54).) 
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57 Cf. Rawls 1996, 58–61.  
58 Rawls 1996, lv. 
59 Rawls 1996, lv-lvi. I discuss the distinction between reasonable pluralism and reasonable disagreement in 
Alnes 2014. 
60 Cf. Rawls 2001, 162–168. 
61 Rawls 1996, lvii. 
62 Cf. Mill 1859, Chapter II. For an illuminative account of the political significance of antagonism in Mill, cf. 
López 2014.  
63 Cohen 2003, 103. 
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65 I follow Toscano’s description of an adversary setting as a “kind of competitive interaction between two or 
more players,” characterized by the fact that “a player wins when the other loses or vice versa” (Toscano 2014, 
402). 
66 I have evaded the phenomenon of compromise, as I think it cuts no ice between political liberalism and the 
politics of dissensus. We have seen that in the parliamentary politics in a well-organized society compromises 
will frequently be made. This fact is not a source for regret. Thus, as I view matters, political liberalism does not 
downplay the role of compromise in politics, despite the impression to the contrary. Compromise is furthermore 
central to the politics of dissensus. (For an analysis of the fascinating notion of a fair compromise, cf. Biale 
2015). 
67 Cf. Palonen and Rosales (eds.) 2015, 19. 
